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Abstract
We examine the impact of ￿scal policy on macroeconomic performance and
welfare when public capital provides both productive and utility services to the
private sector. When these services are subject to congestion, a consumption
tax is distortionary, generating a dynamic adjustment that contrasts with that
of an income tax. In correcting for congestion, an income tax-consumption sub-
sidy combination is the preferred policy when factor-substitutability in produc-
tion is limited. On the other hand, an increase in the elasticity of substitution
in production raises the e¢ cacy of a consumption tax as an alternative to the
income tax. Not recognizing the relative importance of public capital in utility
services might lead the ￿scal authority to incorrectly estimate the impact of
public policies on welfare. The design of optimal ￿scal policy demonstrates the
possibilities for using both income- and consumption-based ￿scal instruments
as opposed to relying on only the income tax rate.
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The role of government in in￿ uencing private economic activity has been a long-standing sub-
ject of investigation amongst economists and policy makers. The existence of public goods and the
associated externalities provides a crucial channel through which government spending and taxa-
tion policies a⁄ect resource allocation and welfare. One strand of literature, starting with Bailey
(1971) and with later contributions by Aschauer (1988) and Barro (1989), assigns an important
role to the government in in￿ uencing economic welfare by focusing on the substitutability between
government consumption and private consumption in the utility function. On the other hand, the
empirical ￿ndings of Aschauer (1989) seemed to suggest that government investment expenditures
also have large productivity e⁄ects on the economy, though the exact empirical magnitude of these
e⁄ects has been much debated in the empirical literature.1 These ￿ndings motivated a second
strand of research based on government expenditure on investment goods, such as infrastructure,
as an important source of growth and well-being.2 In the context of endogenous growth, a sizable
literature was initiated by Barro (1990), which focussed on the ￿ ow of government investment as an
input complementary to private capital in the production process. Later studies by Futagami et
al. (1993), Baxter and King (1993), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), and Turnovsky (1997) argued
that the accumulated stock of government capital, rather than the ￿ ow of expenditures, is more
relevant for production.
Even though the literature on public goods and economic growth has been quite extensive, the
formal treatment of the services provided by these goods has been quite restricted. For example,
there is a clear distinction between public consumption goods that are welfare-enhancing and public
investment goods that are productivity-enhancing. Treating these as distinct public goods has been
a standard characteristic in intertemporal models of growth; see Turnovsky and Fisher (1995) and,
more recently, Turnovsky (2004). However, as a practical matter, it is di¢ cult to rationalize this
distinction and de￿ne public goods as purely consumption or investment goods. The following
example might help to set this discussion in perspective. Consider public infrastructure, often
referred to as "public capital," which is treated purely as a productivity-enhancing input in the
production process. The available stock of roads and highways does indeed enhance private-sector
productivity by facilitating the movement of goods and factors. However, roads and highways might
also be an important source of utility to consumers, who might get pleasure out of driving or taking
road trips.3 Similar examples can be o⁄ered for other aspects of infrastructure, such as power and
water supply, transportation and communication, etc. The argument holds for traditionally de￿ned
public consumption goods as well, such as law and order, postal services, national parks, defense,
etc. While these goods might directly a⁄ect the utility consumers derive from them, they can also
have signi￿cant productivity bene￿ts (by providing security or reducing stress). The point is that
1See Gramlich (1994) for a review of the early empirical literature.
2An early contribution, in the context of the neoclassical growth model, can be traced to Arrow and Kurz (1970).
3The New York Times recently reported that about 87 percent of all vacation travelers in the U.S. (38 million
people) used the country￿ s interstate highway system for road trips during the 2006 Memorial Day weekend.
1di⁄erent agents in the economy (e.g. consumers and ￿rms) can derive di⁄erent types of services
(e.g. utility and productivity) from the accumulated stock of the same public good. In this paper,
we deviate from the existing literature and focus on the dual role that a public good can play, as
both a consumption and an investment good, in in￿ uencing economic activity, growth, and welfare.
We will henceforth refer to this generic public good as "public capital," since the accumulated stock
of this good is the source of the services derived by the private sector. This "de-classi￿cation" of
public goods also provides an extra margin for the government, through the design of ￿scal policy,
to simultaneously target both private production and consumption.4
While public capital can be non-excludable, it is generally subject to some form of rivalry,
whereby the services derived by an individual might be a⁄ected by the services derived by others.
Congestion is often used as a classic example of rivalry associated with public capital, and its
e⁄ects on growth, welfare, and the design of optimal ￿scal policy have been studied by several
authors, including Edwards (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), and Fisher and Turnovsky
(1998). However, the treatment of congestion in this literature is restricted to its e⁄ects on either
production or utility, depending on the type of public good (i.e., consumption or investment) being
modeled. It is entirely plausible that when public capital plays a dual role, di⁄erent agents in the
economy might be subject to di⁄erent degrees of congestion, depending on the type of service they
derive from its underlying stock. This aspect marks the second point of departure of our study
from the existing literature. For example, power outages and shortages in water supply during
peak "usage" seasons such as summer are common examples of congestion in many developing
countries (World Bank, 1994). However, the disutility caused by a power outage for a household
may be quite di⁄erent from the loss in productivity su⁄ered by a ￿rm.
The objective of this paper, therefore, is to study the design and impact of ￿scal policy on
growth and welfare when (i) the economy-wide aggregate stock of public capital provides both
consumption as well as productive services, and (ii) these services are subject to di⁄erential degrees
of congestion. These innovations yield some new insights into how di⁄erent instruments of ￿scal
policy might a⁄ect an economy￿ s equilibrium behavior. We show that with congestion in the
utility services derived from public capital, a consumption tax will be distortionary, a⁄ecting both
the economy￿ s dynamic adjustment and its equilibrium resource allocation. In the presence of
congestion, a consumption tax raises the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
private capital, through the utility services derived from public capital. The dual nature of public
capital plays an important role in this result by linking the marginal utility of consumption and its
relative price to the marginal return on private capital. In general, a consumption tax will work
in a way that is in sharp contrast to that of an income tax. However, the impact of these taxes on
welfare depends crucially on the elasticity of substitution in production and the relative importance
of public capital in the utility function. Our numerical experiments show that in economies with
4We note that the possibility of a dual role played by public investment was ￿rst suggested by Arrow and Kurz
(1970, chapter 1), though they did not provide a formal treatment.
2limited substitutability in production, a combination of an income tax and a consumption subsidy
can yield higher welfare gains relative to using an income or a consumption tax alone. However, as
the elasticity of substitution increases, the e¢ cacy of the consumption tax relative to other ￿scal
instruments increases. In fact, in the limit, when there is perfect substitutability in production,
replacing the income tax with a consumption tax yields the highest welfare gains. We also show
that if the relative importance of public capital in utility is not taken into account, the ￿scal
authority might incorrectly estimate the impact of public policies on welfare. Finally, we show
that in designing optimal ￿scal policy to counter the e⁄ects of congestion, the government has the
￿ exibility to use a mix of ￿scal instruments rather than a single tax or subsidy alone.
We view our results on the distortionary nature of the consumption tax and the design of optimal
￿scal policy as signi￿cant ones, and it would be instructive to relate them to corresponding results
in the literature. The consumption tax has a long history in economics, dating back to Hobbes
(1651) and Mill (1895), with Fisher (1937) and Kaldor (1955) providing the early contributions in
the 20th century.5 More recently, the consumption tax has also occupied a signi￿cant place in
the political debate on tax reform in the United States.6 In the context of endogenous growth,
the appeal of a consumption tax has stemmed mainly from the ￿nding that it is non-distortionary,
thereby providing an important policy tool for the government to ￿nance its expenditures without
a⁄ecting private economic decisions; see Turnovsky (1996). However, the only condition under
which a consumption tax is viewed as a distortionary ￿scal instrument in intertemporal models is
when the work-leisure choice is endogenously determined; see Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998)
and Turnovsky (2000) for some recent examples. Our results indicate that even without a work-
leisure choice, a consumption tax can have distortionary e⁄ects on the economy, due to the dual
nature of the underlying stock of public capital and the presence of congestion in the utility services
derived from it. In that sense, we extend the literature on ￿scal policy and growth by providing
a new mechanism through which a consumption tax might impact growth and welfare. In the
context of designing optimal ￿scal policy, we note that while most of the literature relies on the
income tax as the sole corrective ￿scal instrument for congestion, our results highlight the role of
consumption-based ￿scal instruments as a complement to the income tax.
2 Analytical Framework
We consider a closed economy populated by N in￿nitely lived representative agents, each of
whom maximizes intertemporal utility from the ￿ ow of consumption from a private good C, and
the services derived from the stock of a generic public good, which we shall call "public capital":
U ￿ U
￿
C;Ks
g
￿
=
Z 1
0
1
￿
h
C
￿
Ks
g
￿￿i￿
e￿￿tdt; ￿ 1 < ￿ ￿ 1; 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1; ￿(1 + ￿) < 1 (1)
5See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) for a review of the early literature and Gentry and Hubbard (1997) for a
discussion on the distributional e⁄ects of consumption taxes.
6See, for example, the 2003 United States Economic Report of the President (Chapter 5, pp. 175-212) for a
discussion on the pros and cons of a consumption-based tax system relative to an income-based system.
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g represents the services derived from the aggregate economy-wide stock of public capital, Kg,
and ￿ denotes the weight attached to these services in the utility function, relative to the private
consumption good . The available stock of public capital is non-excludable, but the services derived
from it by an individual agent or consumer may be subject to rivalry, in the form of congestion.
In other words, the "utility" bene￿ts derived by the agent from public capital depend on the usage
of its own private capital (K), relative to the aggregate economy-wide usage ( ￿ K):
Ks
g = Kg
￿
K
￿ K
￿1￿￿c
; 0 ￿ ￿c ￿ 1 (2)
where ￿c parameterizes the degree of relative congestion associated with the utility bene￿ts derived
from public capital.
The stock of public capital, apart from generating utility bene￿ts for the representative agent, is
also available for productive purposes. Each agent produces a private good, whose output is given
by Y , using a CES technology, with its individual stock of private capital and the economy-wide
stock of public capital serving as factors of production. However, the productive services derived
from public capital may also be subject to congestion, in a manner similar to (2):
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; 0 < ￿ < 1; ￿ 1 < ￿ < 1; 0 ￿ ￿y ￿ 1 (3)
where ￿y measures the degree of relative congestion associated with the productive bene￿ts derived
from public capital.7 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution between private and public
capital is given by s = 1=(1 + ￿).8 The parameterization of ￿ in (1) provides a convenient tool
by which the role of public capital in in￿ uencing economic activity can be de￿ned. For example,
with 0 < ￿ < 1, when ￿ > 0; public capital plays a dual role in the economy, by providing both
productive and utility services. On the other hand, when ￿ = 0, public capital is just a productive
input with no direct utility bene￿ts. This corresponds to the standard public capital-growth model
found in the literature, as in Futagami et al. (1993).
The accumulation of private and public capital is enabled by the ￿ ow of new investment into
each capital good, given by:
_ K = I (4a)
_ Kg = G (4b)
7In our speci￿cation, when ￿i = 1 (i = c;y), there is no congestion associated with public capital. In that case,
public capital is a non-rival good available equally to all agents. On the other hand, ￿i = 0 represents a situation of
proportional congestion, where congestion grows with the size of the economy. The case where 0 < ￿i < 1 represents
partial congestion. It is also plausible that the degrees of relative congestion in the utility and production functions
are distinct, i.e., ￿c 6= ￿y.
8Assuming ￿ exibility in the production structure by adopting a CES technology is useful for analyzing the e¢ cacy
of ￿scal policy shocks as the degree of factor substitutability changes. When s = 1 (￿ = 0), we obtain the familiar
Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation. On the other hand, as s ! 0 (￿ ! 1), (3) converges to the ￿xed proportions production
function, and when s ! 1 (￿ ! ￿1), there is perfect substitutability between private and public capital.
4where the I is the ￿ ow of private investment, and G represents the ￿ ow of expenditures on public
capital, which may be undertaken either by a social planner or a government. Finally, the economy￿ s
aggregate resource constraint is given by
Y = C + _ K + _ Kg (5)
The analytical description of the model will proceed sequentially, in the following manner.
First, we will describe the allocation problem in a centrally planned economy. Given this "￿rst-
best" benchmark equilibrium, we will then derive the equlibrium in a decentralized economy. This
sequential analysis will enable us to characterize the design of optimal ￿scal policy in the decentral-
ized economy. The crucial behavioral di⁄erence between the centrally planned economy and the
decentralized one lies in the way the congestion externalities are internalized. In the centralized
economy, the social planner recognizes the relationship between the stocks of individual and aggre-
gate private capital, ￿ K = NK, ex-ante. However, in the decentralized economy, the representative
agent fails to internalize this relationship, although it holds ex-post, in equilibrium. As a result,
the resource allocation problem in the decentralized economy is subject to the various sources of
congestion described in (2) and (3), and consequently is sub-optimal. Optimal ￿scal policy in the
decentralized economy would then entail deriving the appropriate tax and expenditure rates for
the government that would enable a replication of the resource allocation in a centrally planned
economy.
3 A Centrally Planned Economy
Since the social planner in a centrally planned economy internalizes the e⁄ects of congestion
ex-ante, we set ￿ K = NK and normalize N = 1. The planner￿ s utility and production functions
take the form
U =
Z 1
0
1
￿
￿
CK￿
g
￿￿
e￿￿tdt (1a)
Y = A
￿
￿K￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)K￿￿
g
￿￿ 1
￿ (3a)
It is also convenient to begin with the assumption that the social planner allocates a ￿xed fraction,
g, of output to public investment to sustain an equilibrium characterized by endogenous growth.
We will, of course, relax this assumption in a subsequent section to characterize optimal public
investment, i.e., when g is chosen optimally by the planner.
_ Kg = G = gY; 0 < g < 1 (6)
The planner makes the resource allocation decision for the representative agent by choosing
consumption and the accumulation of private and public capital by maximizing (1a) subject to
5(5) and (6), while taking note of (3a) and (4a). The equilibrium relationships will be described
in terms of the following stationary variables: z = Kg=K, the ratio of public to private capital,
c = C=K, the ratio of private consumption to private capital, and y = Y=K, the output-private
capital ratio. Under the assumption that g is arbitrarily ￿xed, the optimality conditions are given
by
C￿￿1K￿￿
g = ￿ (7a)
￿A￿￿ [(1 ￿ g) + qg]y1+￿ = ￿ ￿
_ ￿
￿
(7b)
(1 ￿ ￿)A￿￿ [(1 ￿ g) + qg]
￿y
z
￿1+￿ + ￿
￿c
z
￿
q
+
_ q
q
= ￿ ￿
_ ￿
￿
(7c)
where ￿ is the shadow price of private capital, q is the shadow price of public capital relative to
that of private capital, and y = A[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)z￿￿]￿1=￿.
The optimality conditions (7a)-(7c) can be interpreted as follows. Equation (7a) equates the
marginal utility of consumption to the shadow price of private capital, while (7b) equates the
rate of return on private investment to the corresponding return on consumption. The return on
private investment is adjusted for two factors: the complementarity of private and public capital
in production implies that an increase in private investment must also increase the stock of public
capital, given a ￿xed g. Further, the return on private investment is also o⁄set by the resource cost
of allocating a ￿xed fraction of output to public investment. An analogous interpretation holds for
(7c), which equates the return on public investment to that on consumption. Since public capital
plays a dual role in this economy, both as a consumption and an investment good, its social return
is derived from two sources: (i) the return from production, given by the ￿rst term on the left-hand
side of (7c), and (ii) the return from utility, given by the second term, ￿(c=z); which measures the
marginal rate of substitution between the private consumption good and the stock of public capital.
Additionally, the last term on the left-hand side of (7c) describes the capital gains emanating from
the rate of change of its real price q (given that private capital is treated as the numeraire good).
Using (5), (6), (7a), and (7b), we can derive the equilibrium growth rates for private capital,
public capital, and consumption:
 k =
_ K
K
= A(1 ￿ g)
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)z￿￿￿￿ 1
￿ ￿ c (8a)
 g =
_ Kg
Kg
= gA[(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿z￿]
￿ 1
￿ (8b)
 c =
_ C
C
=
￿A￿￿ [(1 ￿ g) + qg]y1+￿ + ￿￿g (y=z) ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
(8c)
Note that the growth rate of consumption in (8c) depends not only on the marginal return on
private capital, but also on the marginal utility return derived from the consumption of public
6capital, as long as ￿ > 0.
3.1 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
The core dynamics of the centrally planned economy can be expressed by the evolution of the
stationary variables z, c, and q and can be expressed using (8a)-(8c), and by equating (7b) and
(7c):
_ z
z
= gA[(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿z￿]
￿ 1
￿ ￿ A(1 ￿ g)
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)z￿￿￿￿ 1
￿ + c (9a)
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c
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￿A￿￿ [(1 ￿ g) + qg]y1+￿ + ￿￿g (y=z) ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿ A(1 ￿ g)
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￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)z￿￿￿￿ 1
￿ + c (9b)
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￿c
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￿
(9c)
The steady-state equilibrium is attained when _ z = _ c = _ q = 0; and is characterized by balanced
growth in the two types of capital and consumption, and a constant relative price of public capital:
gA[(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿~ z￿]
￿ 1
￿ = A(1 ￿ g)
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)~ z￿￿￿￿ 1
￿ ￿ c (10a)
￿A￿￿ [(1 ￿ g) + ~ qg] ~ y1+￿ + ￿￿g (~ y=~ z) ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
= A(1 ￿ g)
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i￿ 1
￿ ￿ ~ c (10b)
A￿￿ [(1 ￿ g) + ~ qg]
h
￿~ q ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)~ z￿(1+￿)
i
~ y1+￿ = ￿
￿
~ c
~ z
￿
(10c)
Equations (10a)-(10c) can be solved to yield the steady-state values of ~ z; ~ c; and ~ q, given a ￿xed g.
The dynamic behavior of the equilibrium system (9) can be expressed in a linearized form around
the steady state (~ z; ~ c; ~ q):
_ X = ￿
￿
X ￿ ~ X
￿
(11)
where X0 = (z;c;q), ~ X0 = (~ z; ~ c; ~ q), and ￿ represents the 3x3 coe¢ cient matrix of the linearized
system. It can be demonstrated that the linearized dynamic system (11) is characterized by
one sTable (negative) and two unsTable (positive) eigenvalues, thereby generating saddle-point
behavior.
3.2 Optimal Public Expenditure
The centrally planned economic system described in section 3.1 was based on the assumption
that the social planner allocates an arbitrarily ￿xed fraction of output to expenditure on public
capital. However, it is plausible that the planner makes an optimal choice with respect to g to
attain the ￿rst-best resource allocation. In that case, the optimization problem is independent of
the constraint in (6). Consequently, the optimal share of public expenditure in output, say g = ^ g,
is derived endogenously from equilibrium.
7Performing this optimization, we ￿nd that
^ q = 1 (12)
In other words, in choosing the optimal quantity of public expenditure, the planner must ensure that
the shadow prices of the two capital goods (private and public) are equalized along the transition
path. Substituting (12) in (10b) and (10c), while taking note of (10a), we can re-write the steady-
state conditions as follows ("^" denotes the steady-state value of a variable when g is set optimally):
^ gA[(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿^ z￿]
￿ 1
￿ = A(1 ￿ ^ g)
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)^ z￿￿￿￿ 1
￿ ￿ ^ c (13a)
￿A￿￿^ y1+￿ + ￿￿^ g (^ y=^ z) ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
= A(1 ￿ ^ g)
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)^ z￿￿￿￿ 1
￿ ￿ ^ c (13b)
A￿￿
h
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)^ z￿(1+￿)
i
^ y1+￿ = ￿
￿
^ c
^ z
￿
(13c)
Given (12), we can solve (13a)-(13c) for the optimal steady-state values of ^ z; ^ c; and ^ g:
An interesting point to note here is that (12) implies that _ q = 0 at all points of time. Therefore,
the core dynamics are independent of the (unitary) real shadow price of public capital. Substituting
(12) into (9b) and noting (9a), we see that when g is set at its optimal level, the dynamics are
reduced to a second-order system and can be expressed solely in terms of z and c:
_ z
z
= ^ gA[(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿z￿]
￿ 1
￿ ￿ A(1 ￿ ^ g)
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)z￿￿￿￿ 1
￿ + c (14a)
_ c
c
=
￿A￿￿y1+￿ + ￿￿^ g (y=z) ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿ A(1 ￿ ^ g)
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)z￿￿￿￿ 1
￿ + c (14b)
When the planner optimally allocates output to private and public capital, the resource costs
appearing in (7b) and (7c) are no longer relevant. However, in evaluating the marginal costs
and bene￿ts of the private and public expenditure decisions, the planner must consider the fact
that allocating an extra unit of output to the public good provides not only a productivity return,
but also a utility return. This aspect of the model represents a signi￿cant departure from earlier
work regarding the optimality of public investment in endogenous growth models. For example,
Turnovsky (1997) ￿nds that when g is chosen optimally, the economy is always on a balanced
growth path and devoid of transitional dynamics. However, we see from (13) and (14), that once
the social planner chooses the optimal allocation of g, the ratios of public to private capital (z)
and consumption to private capital (c) are not constant, but evolve gradually along the transition
path, while the social planner ensures that the shadow prices of the two capital goods are always
equalized. The key point here is that since public capital provides an additional return from utility,
the corresponding investment in private capital must track this return along the transition path
for (12) to hold. As a result, z and c must adjust accordingly at each point of time, until the
steady-state equilibrium is attained.
8It is easy to demonstrate that the relative weight of public capital in the utility function (￿)
plays a crucial role in this result. To see this, assume that ￿ = 0 in (10). Given that ^ q = 1, it is
immediately evident from (10c) that
^ z =
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿ 1
1+￿
This implies that _ z = 0 at all points of time. Consequently, from (10b), it turns out that _ c = 0 must
also hold if the transversality conditions are to be satis￿ed. Therefore, in the special case where
￿ = 0, the economy is always on its balanced growth path and there is no dynamic adjustment.
This is essentially the result obtained in Turnovsky (1997). We can then conclude that the utility
function (1) represents a general speci￿cation, from which earlier results in the literature can be
derived as a special case, depending on the magnitude of ￿.
4 A Decentralized Economy
We now consider the case of a decentralized economy where the government plays a passive
role, while the representative agent makes its own resource allocation decisions. There are two
crucial behavioral di⁄erences between this regime and the centrally planned economy described in
section 3. First, the government now provides the entire stock of public capital using the ￿nancial
and policy instruments at its disposal, while the representative agent takes this stock as exogenously
given in making its private allocation decisions with respect to consumption and private investment.
Second, the representative agent does not internalize the e⁄ects of the two sources of congestion
externality, ￿c and ￿y. The utility function for the representative agent in this regime is therefore
given by
U =
Z 1
0
1
￿
"
CK￿
g
￿
K
￿ K
￿￿(1￿￿c)#￿
e￿￿tdt (1c)
while the production function is given by (3):
Y = A
"
￿K￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
(
Kg
￿
K
￿ K
￿1￿￿y
)￿￿#￿ 1
￿
(3)
The agent accumulates wealth in the form of private capital and holdings of government bonds,
and is subject to the following accumulation constraint
_ K + _ B = (1 ￿ ￿y)(Y + rB) ￿ (1 + ￿c)C ￿ T (15)
where r is the interest earnings on government bonds, ￿y is the income tax rate, ￿c is the con-
sumption tax rate, and T is a lump-sum tax. Taking the stock of Kg as given, the agent chooses
its ￿ ow of consumption, private investment, and holdings of government bonds to maximize (1c),
9subject to the ￿ ow budget constraint (15) and the accumulation rule (4a), while taking note of
(3). It is important to note here that in performing its optimization, the representative agent fails
to internalize the relationship ￿ K = NK, although it will hold in equilibrium. As before, we will
express the equilibrium in terms of the stationary variables z and c, and normalize N = 1, without
loss of generality. Since the agent does not make an allocation decision with respect to public
capital, q is not relevant in this regime.
The optimality conditions for the above maximization problem are
C￿￿1K￿￿
g = ￿(1 + ￿c) (16a)
(1 ￿ ￿y)A￿￿[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y)z￿￿]y1+￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿c)(1 + ￿c)c = ￿ ￿
_ ￿
￿
(16b)
￿ ￿
_ ￿
￿
= (1 ￿ ￿y)r (16c)
The interpretation of the optimality conditions (16a)-(16b) is analogous to that of the centrally
planned economy, except that in (16b), the rate of return on private capital is subject to the sources
of congestion in production and utility. The presence of congestion in production as well as utility
raises the total market return on private capital when K increases, by increasing the productive
and utility services derived from the stock of public capital. The last term on the left-hand side
of (16b), ￿(1￿￿c)(1+￿c)c, represents the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
private capital generated by congestion in the utility function. In other words, it re￿ ects the price
of consumption relative to private capital. This is the crucial channel through which a consumption
tax might a⁄ect the agent￿ s resource allocation decisions along the equilibrium path. Equation
(16c) equates the rate of return on consumption to the return on government bond holdings, and
represents the no-arbitrage condition that equalizes the returns from consumption, private capital,
and government bonds.
The government provides the necessary expenditure in public capital, which accumulates ac-
cording to
_ Kg = G = gY; 0 < g < 1 (17)
where g represents the fraction of output spent by the government for the accumulation of public
capital. This investment is ￿nanced by tax revenues and issuing government debt. The govern-
ment￿ s ￿ ow budget constraint is given by
_ B = r(1 ￿ ￿y)B + G ￿ (￿yY + ￿cC + T) (18)
Equation (18) states to the extent that interest payments on debt and expenditure on the pub-
lic good exceed tax revenues, the government will ￿nance the resulting de￿cit by issuing debt.
Combining (18) with (15) yields the aggregate resource constraint for the economy, given by (5).
104.1 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
The equilibrium dynamics in the decentralized economy can be expressed by
_ z
z
= gA[(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿z￿]
￿ 1
￿ ￿ A(1 ￿ g)
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)z￿￿￿￿ 1
￿ + c (19a)
_ c
c
=
(1 ￿ ￿y)A￿￿ [￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y)z￿￿]y1+￿ + ￿[(1 ￿ ￿c)(1 + ￿c)c + ￿g (y=z)] ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿A(1 ￿ g)
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)z￿￿￿￿ 1
￿ + c (19b)
The steady-state equilibrium is attained when _ z = _ c = 0 and is characterized by balanced growth
in the two capital stocks and consumption:
gA[(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿~ z￿]
￿ 1
￿ = A(1 ￿ g)
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)~ z￿￿￿￿ 1
￿ ￿ ~ c (20a)
(1 ￿ ￿y)A￿￿ [￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y)~ z￿￿] ~ y1+￿ + ￿[(1 ￿ ￿c)(1 + ￿c)~ c + ￿g (~ y=~ z)] ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
= A(1 ￿ g)
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)~ z￿￿￿￿ 1
￿ ￿ ~ c (20b)
Equations (20a) and (20b) can be solved for the steady-state values of ~ z and ~ c. The dynamic
evolution of the economy and the steady-state equilibrium are independent of the shadow price of
public capital, q. This happens because the representative agent treats the government-provided
public capital stock as exogenous to its private decisions. As a result, the agent does not internalize
the e⁄ect of its private investment decisions on the evolution of public capital.
4.1.1 Income versus Consumption Taxes in the Presence of Congestion
The macroeconomic equilibrium for the decentralized economy, described in (19) and (20),
provides some new insights into the interaction between private resource allocation decisions and
the government￿ s ￿scal instruments. One interesting result to emerge from this analysis is that the
consumption tax, ￿c, can be distortionary, a⁄ecting both the dynamic evolution and the steady-
state equilibrium of the economy. However, for the consumption tax to have distortionary e⁄ects,
two conditions must be simultaneously satis￿ed: (i) public capital provides utility services (￿ > 0)
as well as productive services, and (ii) the utility services derived from public capital are subject
to congestion (0 < ￿c < 1). Intuitively, in the presence of congestion in utility, a change in the
consumption tax rate will increase the marginal rate of substitution between private consumption
and private capital through the utility services derived from public capital, which in turn a⁄ect the
market return from private capital, given by (16b). We view this as a new result in the public
capital-growth literature, since previous studies have shown that in the absence of an endogenous
11work-leisure choice, a consumption tax is non-distortionary and hence is similar to a lump-sum
tax. Our results indicate an alternative transmission mechanism for the consumption tax, even in
the absence of the labor-leisure choice: the dual role played by public capital as both a utility and
productivity-enhancing good, as well as the existence of congestion in the utility services derived
from its stock.
The steady-state equilibrium described in (20a) and (20b) also throws some light on the way an
income and a consumption tax might impact the economy in the presence of congestion externalities.
Since both the utility and productive services from public capital are congested by private usage,
the market return on private capital in a decentralized economy is above its socially optimal level,
given by (7b). Therefore, the steady-state equilibrium is characterized by "too much" private
investment and "too little" private consumption, relative to the social optimum. In this scenario,
the goal of public policy would be to reduce the market return on private capital. From (16b)
and (20), it is clear that an increase in income tax will help alleviate congestion by reducing the
after-tax marginal return on private capital. On the other hand, an increase in the consumption
tax works exactly in the opposite direction, by increasing the after-tax return on capital. This
happens because, in the presence of congestion in utility services, a consumption tax will increase
the relative price of consumption, and lower that of private capital; see (16b). However, the
impact of these tax rates on intertemporal welfare will depend crucially on the private allocation
of resources between consumption and private investment. This allocation in turn will depend on
(i) the elasticity of substitution in production, and (ii) the relative importance of the services from
public capital in the utility function. These insights give us an important basis for comparing
the dynamic e⁄ects of the two competing ￿scal instruments, i.e., the income and consumption tax
rates, which we will consider subsequently in section 5 by undertaking a numerical analysis of the
model.
4.2 Optimal Fiscal Policy
Given that income and consumption taxes impact the economy in very di⁄erent ways, it is
instructive to ask, what tax and expenditure rates in the decentralized economy will replicate the
￿rst-best equilibrium attained by the social planner? Let these choices be represented by the vector
￿0 = (^ g;^ ￿y;^ ￿c). Then, by de￿nition, ￿ is a description of the design of optimal ￿scal policy in the
decentralized economy.
To determine these optimal choices, we will compare the equilibrium outcome in the decen-
tralized and centrally planned economies. Since our focus is on the two distortionary tax rates,
we will assume that g is set optimally at ^ g, given by the solution to (13), and is appropriately
￿nanced by some combination of non-distortionary lump-sum taxes and government debt. Given
^ g, a comparison of (13b) and (20b) yields the following optimal relationship between the income
12and consumption tax rates:
￿y =
A￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y)(y=z)￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿c)(1 + ￿c)(c=y)
A￿￿[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y)z￿￿]y￿ (21)
From (21), we see that in the presence of congestion in both production and utility, only one tax rate
can be chosen independently to attain the ￿rst-best equilibrium. This implies that the government
has a choice in the "mix" between the income and consumption tax rates: if one is set arbitrarily,
the other automatically adjusts to satisfy (21) and enable the socially optimal resource allocation.
But the crucial question is, what kind of a policy "mix" must the government choose? Given the
dependency of the two tax rates on one another, a unique combination of ￿y and ￿c is unattainable.
However, a unique feature of (21) is that even if one individual tax instrument is at its non-optimal
level, the government can adjust the other appropriately to attain the social optimum.
To see this ￿ exibility in designing optimal ￿scal policy, note that the income and consumption
tax rates are positively related to each other in the optimal relationship given by (21). A useful
benchmark, then, is to derive the tax on income, say ^ ￿y, when ￿c = 0. Given this benchmark rate,
we can evaluate the role of the consumption-based tax when the actual income tax rate, ￿y, di⁄ers
from its benchmark rate, ^ ￿y. When consumption taxes are absent, i.e., ￿c = 0, the appropriate
tax on income is given by
^ ￿y =
A￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y)(y=z)￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿c)(c=y)
A￿￿[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y)z￿￿]y￿ > 0 (22)
Therefore, the income tax rate that must be levied to attain the ￿rst-best optimum must correct
for both the sources of externalities, ￿y and ￿c and take into account the impact of public capital
on utility, ￿. In other words, the optimal income tax reduces the rate of return on private capital
to its social return by targeting the e⁄ect of its usage on both productivity and utility. Even if
the production externality is absent, i.e., ￿y = 1, but the consumption externality is present, i.e.,
0 < ￿c < 1, the optimal income tax must be positive, to correct the distortions in utility caused
by private investment. Also, note that when public capital provides direct utility bene￿ts (￿ > 0),
the optimal income tax rate is higher than those derived in the previous literature, namely Barro
(1990), Futagami et al. (1993), and Turnovsky (1997).
Now suppose that the actual income tax rate is di⁄erent from its benchmark rate derived in
(22). The government has a choice to use the consumption tax to correct for this deviation, and
yet attain the ￿rst-best optimum without a⁄ecting the income tax rate. To see this, subtract (22)
from (21):
￿c =
A￿￿[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y)z￿￿]y￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿c)(c=y)
(￿y ￿ ^ ￿y)
Therefore, when ￿y > ^ ￿y, the government must introduce a positive consumption tax (￿c > 0) to
attain the ￿rst-best equilibrium, without changing the income tax rate. On the other hand, if
13￿y < ^ ￿y, a consumption subsidy (￿c < 0) is the appropriate corrective ￿scal instrument. In the
case where ￿y = ^ ￿y as in (22), the consumption tax must be zero (￿c = 0). The intuition behind
this result can be explained as follows. When the income tax rate is above its benchmark rate
given in (22), the private return on capital falls below its socially optimal return. In this case,
a positive tax on consumption helps o⁄set this deviation by raising the private return to capital
relative to consumption. Conversely, if the income tax rate is below its benchmark rate, then the
private return on capital exceeds its social return and a consumption subsidy corrects this deviation
by lowering the private return on capital relative to consumption.
Of course, when there is no congestion in utility (￿c = 1) or when public capital is purely a
productive input (￿ = 0), this margin of adjustment is non-existent and the consumption tax has
no bearing on the equilibrium allocation. In this case, the optimal tax on income is the only
corrective ￿scal instrument and is similar to that obtained in the public-capital growth literature9:
^ ￿y =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y)
[￿z￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y)]
Our discussion of optimal ￿scal policy can be evaluated by relating it to the corresponding
literature on congestion, taxation, and growth. A useful benchmark in this literature is a paper
by Turnovsky (1996). In that paper, a consumption tax is non-distortionary and works like a
lump-sum tax, and must be reduced to zero as the degree of congestion increases, while the income
tax emerges as the sole policy instrument when there is proportional congestion. When there
is no congestion in production, the optimal income tax rate is zero and government expenditure
must be ￿nanced by the non-distortionary consumption tax. Our results can be viewed both as
an improvement and a generalization of these results. First, we show that under certain very
plausible conditions, the consumption tax is distortionary, both in transition as well as in steady-
state. Second, we show that a consumption-based ￿scal instrument (in the form of a tax or
subsidy) can be used jointly with an income tax to correct for di⁄erent sources of congestion in an
economy. Third, when there is no congestion in production (￿y = 1), the income tax rate must
still be positive, with or without a consumption tax or subsidy, to correct for distortions in utility.
Finally, when there is no congestion in utility (￿c = 1), the consumption tax is non-distortionary
and our results are comparable to those in Turnovsky (1996) as well as most of the literature.
5 Fiscal Policy and Transitional Dynamics: A Numerical Analysis
We begin our analysis of the framework laid out in sections 3 and 4 with a numerical char-
acterization of both the centrally planned and decentralized economies. In particular, we are
interested in (i) analyzing the role played by the relative importance of public capital services in
utility (￿) in the propagation of ￿scal policy shocks (g; ￿y; and ￿c), and (ii) comparing the dynamic
9For an example with the Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation, see Turnovsky (1997).
14e⁄ects of an increase in the consumption tax rate with an equivalent increase in the tax on capital
income. Finally, we would also like to examine the sensitivity of the e⁄ects of the various ￿scal
policy shocks on welfare with respect to (i) the elasticity of substitution in production, (ii) the
congestion parameters, and (iii) the relative importance of public capital in utility.
5.1 Equilibrium in a Centrally Planned Economy
Our starting point is the steady-state equilibrium in the centrally planned economy, which will
serve as a useful benchmark. The following Table describes the choices of the structural and policy
parameters we use to calibrate this benchmark economy:
Preference Parameters: ￿ = ￿1:5; ￿ = 0:04; ￿ 2 [0; 0:3]
Production Parameters: A = 0:4; ￿ = 0:8; s 2 [0:25; 1)
The preference parameters ￿ and ￿ are chosen to yield an intertemporal elasticity of substitution
in consumption of 0.4, which is consistent with Ogaki and Reinhart (1998). There is no known
estimate of ￿, the relative weight of public capital in utility, and therefore we consider a range
between 0 and 0.3, where ￿ = 0 corresponds to the standard public capital-growth framework
where public capital enters only the production function, and ￿ = 0:3 corresponds to the estimate
of the ratio of public consumption to private consumption, used by Turnovsky (2004).10 The
output elasticity of private capital is set at 0.8, which is reasonable if we consider private capital
to be an amalgam of physical and human capital, as in Romer (1986). This of course implies that
the corresponding elasticity for public capital is 0.2, which is consistent with the empirical evidence
reviewed by Gramlich (1994). Finally, we are not aware of any empirical estimate for the elasticity
of substitution between the two types of capital in production, s = 1=(1+￿), and therefore choose a
range between 0.25, indicating limited substitutability between K and Kg, and in￿nity, indicating
perfect factor substitutability. The case where s = 1 (￿ = 0) represents the familiar Cobb-Douglas
technology, and will serve as a useful benchmark.
Table 1 characterizes the steady-state equilibrium in a centrally planned economy, for di⁄erent
values of ￿. When ￿ = 0, the equilibrium outcome corresponds to the literature which treats public
capital purely as a productive investment good. Therefore, considering the outcomes when ￿ > 0
provides a useful insight into its role in resource allocation. For example, when ￿ = 0, the optimal
ratio of public to private capital (^ z) is 0.25, while the corresponding value for the consumption
capital ratio (^ c) is about 0.2. Optimal public expenditure (^ g) is 0.067, indicating that 6.7 percent
of output is allocated for public investment. The consumption-output and capital-output ratios are
0.67 and 3.30, respectively, while the steady state is characterized by a balanced growth rate of 8.1
10It should be noted here that Turnovsky (2004) treats the public good in the utility function as a pure consumption
good, with no productive e⁄ects, as does most of the literature, where public consumption and investment goods
are clearly distinguishable. Moreover, treatments of public consumption goods typically consider a ￿ ow of services,
whereas in our case it is the accumulated stock that is relevant.
15percent.11 As ￿ increases, the utility return from public expenditure increases, thereby augmenting
its total return, causing the central planner to allocate a larger fraction of output to public capital
relative to private investment. This is re￿ ected by an increase in the equilibrium levels of ^ z
and ^ g. A larger stock of public capital, being complementary to private consumption, facilitates
the consumption of the private good, leading to an increase in ^ c. The consumption-output and
capital-output ratios are lower for higher values of ￿, indicating that the higher ^ g expands output
proportionately larger than consumption and private capital. Finally, for small values of ￿ (e:g:
￿ = 0:1), the equilibrium growth rate is higher, due to larger public investment. However, when
￿ = 0:3, almost 11.5 percent of output is allocated to public investment (compared to 6.7 percent
when ￿ = 0), and the large stock of public capital is subject to diminishing returns, leading to a
lower equilibrium growth rate relative to the case when ￿ = 0.
Table 2 illustrates the optimal rates of public expenditure as a fraction of output in the centrally
planned economy, for variations in both ￿ and the elasticity of substitution, s. As in Table 1, we
see that for any given s, an increase in ￿ above zero will lead the planner to allocate a higher
fraction of output to investment in public capital. On the other hand, for any given ￿, an increase
in the elasticity of substitution, s, will lower the equilibrium allocation of ^ g. This happens because
a larger s increases the return on private capital relative to public capital, leading the planner
to allocate fewer resources to public capital and more to private capital on the margin. Another
interesting feature of Table 2 is the relationship between the rate of optimal public expenditure, the
relative weight of public capital in utility, and the output elasticity of public capital. For example,
in the ￿ ow model of Barro (1990), the optimal (welfare-maximizing) rate of public investment
is given by, say, g￿ = 1 ￿ ￿ = 0:2 (since ￿ = 0:8 in our calibration), i.e., by setting the rate
of public investment equal to its output elasticity: However, Turnovsky (1997) shows that when
public investment is treated as a stock variable rather than a ￿ ow, g￿ < 1 ￿ ￿. In Table 2, this
corresponds to the case where ￿ = 0, and let us denote this rate by ^ g￿=0. Our numerical results
show that when the utility bene￿ts of public capital are internalized by the planner (￿ > 0), the
optimal rate of public expenditure, say, ^ g￿>0, is still lower than (1 ￿ ￿); but is higher than ^ g￿=0,
i.e., ^ g￿=0 < ^ g￿>0 < g￿ = 1 ￿ ￿. For example, when s = 1, and ￿ = 0, ^ g￿=0 = 0:0668. But when
￿ = 0:3; ^ g￿>0 = 0:1149:
5.2 Equilibrium in a Decentralized Economy
Table 3 characterizes the benchmark equilibrium and long-run e⁄ects of ￿scal policy shocks
in a decentralized economy under the Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation (s = 1). Since it is di¢ cult
to conceptualize a decentralized economy without any congestion, we consider the case of partial
congestion, with ￿y = ￿c = 0:5 serving as a benchmark speci￿cation, while ￿ is set at 0:3 in the
11The calibration of the model is purely for illustrative purposes, rather than approximating a real economy, though
some of the equilibrium quantities, like the consumption-output and capital-output ratios, lie in their corresponding
empirically estimated ranges.
16utility function.12 The pre-shock ￿scal policy parameters are set arbitrarily at g = 0:1; ￿y = 0:1;
and ￿c = 0:13
Starting with the benchmark equilibrium, we see that the ratio of public to private capital is
approximately 0.38, while the consumption-capital ratio is about 0.21. The representative agent
devotes about 63 percent of output to consumption, while the capital-output ratio is 3.04. Finally,
these allocations lead to a long-run balanced growth rate of about 8.74 percent.
5.2.1 Long-run E⁄ects of Fiscal Policy Shocks
The panels of Table 3 report the long-run impact of ￿ve ￿scal policy shocks on the equilibrium
resource allocation in the decentralized economy:14 (i) an increase in g, the share of output claimed
by the government for public investment, from its pre-shock level of 0.1 to 0.2, (ii) an increase in
the income tax rate, ￿y, from 0.1 to 0.2, (iii) an increase in the consumption tax rate, ￿c, from 0 to
0.1, (iv) a mix of an income tax increase and a consumption subsidy, where ￿y increases from 0.1
to 0.2, while ￿c is reduced from 0 to -0.1 (representing a 10 percent subsidy to consumption), and
(v) replacing the income tax rate with a consumption tax, where ￿y is reduced from its benchmark
rate of 0.1 to 0, while ￿c is increased from 0 to 0.1.
I. An increase in public investment (g): A higher share of output claimed by the government
for public investment, which is ￿nanced by an appropriate adjustment in government debt or lump-
sum taxes, leads to a higher ￿ ow of investment in public capital, thereby increasing its long-run
stock relative to private capital (z). The higher stock of public capital increases the long-run
productivity of private capital, thereby encouraging an increase in private investment. This leads
to a substitution away from private consumption towards private investment, leading to a long-run
decline in the consumption-capital ratio (c). As the ￿ ow of output increases due to the shift
towards investment, private consumption also increases. However, given the higher stocks of the
two types of capital, output increases more than in proportion to both consumption and private
capital, leading to declines in their respective proportions in total output. The investment boom
also increases the long-run equilibrium growth rate and welfare. For example, the long-run growth
rate increases from 8.74 to approximately 10 percent, while welfare increases by about 2.27 percent.
The increase in welfare can be attributed to two factors: (a) an indirect e⁄ect, operating through the
investment channel which, by increasing the ￿ ow of output, generates a higher ￿ ow of consumption,
12Even though we set the two congestion parameters to be equal, we will consider the sensitivity of the results to
their variation in Table 4B.
13Both g and ￿y represent fractions of aggregate output and are set at 10 percent each. However, the consumption
tax rate, ￿c, is set at 0 to make it comparable to much of the existing growth literature, where it mainly works as
a non-distortionary lump-sum tax. Since in our model ￿c is distortionary, the e⁄ects of its variation from zero will
provide a useful insight into its role in equilibrium resource allocation.
14Note that the changes in the growth rate and welfare are expressed as percentages. Long-run welfare is measured
by numerically evaluating the integral W =
1 Z
0
(C(t)Kg(t)￿)￿
￿ e
￿￿tdt, when C(t) and Kg(t) are on their respective
equilibrium paths.
17and (b) a direct e⁄ect, since the increase in the stock of public capital lowers congestion and leads
to an increase in the proportion of utility services derived from its stock, given that ￿ > 0
II. An increase in the income tax rate (￿y) : The higher tax on private income lowers the after-
tax return on private capital. This leads the agent to substitute away from private investment
towards consumption. As a result, the stock of private capital falls and, with a ￿xed g, leads to
a long-run increase in z and c. Consequently, the capital-output ratio falls and the consumption-
output ratio increases. The increase in z reduces the average product of public capital and,
combined with the lower return from private capital, reduces the long-run growth rate. The higher
income tax rate also has a positive impact on welfare, which can be attributed to two reinforcing
factors: (i) the substitution towards consumption, and (ii) the smaller stock of private capital, which
in turn generates higher services from public capital in the utility function by reducing congestion,
given that ￿ > 0.
III. An increase in the consumption tax rate (￿c) : In the presence of congestion in utility
(0 ￿ ￿c < 1) and with ￿ > 0, the introduction of a consumption tax is distortionary in a manner
opposite to an income tax. The higher consumption tax a⁄ects the marginal rate of substitution
between private consumption and the services derived from public capital, by increasing the relative
price of consumption. From (16b), we see that this raises the after-tax return on private capital,
as the substitution from consumption towards savings increases the stock of private capital and
consequently the services derived from public capital. As a result, z; c; and the consumption-output
ratio decline in equilibrium. With a ￿xed g, the higher capital stock raises the capital-output ratio
and the equilibrium growth rate. However, the higher consumption tax makes the economy worse
o⁄ by reducing welfare. The welfare loss is due to (a) the fall in private consumption, and (b) the
higher stock of private capital, which worsens the distortions created by congestion in the utility
function by reducing the utility services derived from the stock of public capital.
In the absence of congestion in utility (￿c = 1), the consumption tax is non-distortionary and
operates in a manner similar to a lump-sum tax. It must also be noted that the e⁄ects of a
consumption tax increase are quite small, compared to those of an income tax. This happens
because the consumption tax is tied to the ￿ ow of consumption, which in turn is a fraction of
output. Therefore, the magnitude of, say, a 10 percent tax on consumption is much smaller to
an equivalent tax on income, as a proportion of aggregate output. Further, from (16b), we see
that the increase in the rate of return on private capital caused by a higher consumption tax is
proportional to ￿(1 ￿ ￿c)c, which is also quite small in magnitude.
IV. An increase in the income tax rate combined with a consumption subsidy (d￿y > 0; d￿c < 0) :
Given that in the presence of congestion in the utility function, a consumption tax increase makes
the economy worse o⁄, it would be easy to show that a consumption subsidy would have a positive
welfare impact on the economy, by drawing resources away from capital into consumption, which
in turn would help alleviate the distortions from congestion. In this sense, a consumption subsidy
18might reinforce the e⁄ect of an income tax increase, and it would be instructive to compare the
e⁄ects of such a policy "mix" with the e⁄ects of raising the income tax alone. Such a combination
does indeed have a larger impact on the economy￿ s resource allocation relative to an increase in the
income tax alone, including the positive impact on long-run welfare. This happens because the
income tax and the consumption subsidy target the two sources of congestion more e¢ ciently than a
single ￿scal instrument. The income tax, by reducing the stock of capital, reduces congestion in the
production function, while the consumption subsidy, by lowering the relative price of consumption,
draws more resources away from private capital, increasing the services derived from public capital
in the utility function. Moreover, a tax-subsidy policy mix also enables the government to use the
income tax revenues to ￿nance the consumption subsidy. A policy implication that emerges from
this discussion is that when the government is faced with congestion associated with public capital
in the utility function, a mix of income tax and consumption subsidy might be more e⁄ective at
reducing distortions than using an income tax (or a consumption subsidy) alone.
V. Replacing the income tax rate with a consumption tax: The cut in the income tax rate
(to zero) and the introduction of a positive consumption tax raises the after-tax return on private
capital, both by reducing the after-tax marginal product of private capital and by raising the
relative price of private consumption. This leads to a large increase in private investment and,
consequently, the stock of private capital. As a result, both z and c decline, while the capital-
output ratio rises. The substitution away from consumption (due to the positive consumption
tax) and the private investment boom (due to the removal of the income tax) leads to a decline
in the consumption-output ratio and an increase in the long-run growth rate. However, from a
welfare perspective, such a policy is socially undesirable, as the increase in private capital worsens
the distortions associated with the congestion externalities. In fact, the long-run welfare loss of
-1.07 percent is the worst among all the policy shocks considered in this section.
5.2.2 Transitional Dynamics
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the dynamic response of the decentralized economy to ￿scal policy
shocks (i)-(iii). In each ￿gure, we have set s = 1 (Cobb-Douglas), with ￿y = ￿c = 0:5. Since
we have already outlined the basic intuition behind the long-run e⁄ects of policy changes, our
discussion here can be brief.
Figure 1 depicts the transitional response of the economy to an increase in the rate of public
investment, g. The higher ￿ ow of public investment leads to an accumulation of public capital
relative to private capital, thereby raising z over time to its higher steady-state level. The implied
increase in the long-run productivity of private capital and consequently the lower marginal utility
of consumption leads to a substitution away from consumption on impact of the shock. As a result,
both the consumption-capital ratio and the consumption-output ratio fall instantaneously. The
growth rate of public capital jumps up on impact, over-shooting its higher long-run equilibrium.
Thereafter, as public capital is accumulated, its average product, y=z, declines and its growth rate
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falls instantaneously due to crowding out following the increase in g. However, the increase in
z over time raises the average productivity of private capital, thereby increasing its growth rate
in transition to a new and higher equilibrium. The growth rate of consumption also declines on
impact, but increases thereafter as the two capital stocks are accumulated and the ￿ ow of output
is increased. However, the transitional growth rate of consumption exceeds that of private capital
since the higher stock of public capital increases the ￿ ow of utility services derived by the private
agent over time, in the proportion ￿￿g(y=z); see (19b). The consumption-capital ratio therefore
rises in transition, although it converges to a lower equilibrium value in the new steady state.
Further, the rate of growth of output exceeds that of consumption and private capital, leading to
continuous declines of the consumption-output and capital-output ratios to their lower after-shock
equilibrium levels.
Figure 2 compares the dynamic responses generated by an income tax increase (panel A) and
a consumption tax increase (panel B). It is immediately evident that the two responses are mirror
images of each other, implying that in the presence of congestion, the two tax rates have opposite
impacts on the adjustment of equilibrium variables. An increase in ￿y leads to a substitution away
from private capital by reducing its after-tax rate of return. With a ￿xed g, this implies that
z declines over time as the stock of private capital falls relative to public capital. On the other
hand, a higher ￿c, by increasing the return on private capital relative to consumption, leads to an
increase in private capital accumulation, thereby increasing z in transition. The higher income tax
will cause an immediate substitution in favor of private consumption, leading to an instantaneous
upward jump in c. Exactly the opposite happens for the consumption tax increase, as the agent
substitutes away from consumption towards private investment. Consequently, the consumption-
output ratio jumps up for an income tax increase, but jumps down for a consumption tax increase.
The dynamic responses of the growth rates of private and public capital, as well as consumption,
also are in sharp contrast to each other for the two tax shocks. For an income tax increase, the
growth rates of private capital and consumption jump down on impact. The downward jump of
the consumption growth rate re￿ ects the permanent reduction in the after-tax return on private
capital. The growth rate of public capital does not respond instantaneously, since g is ￿xed and
the average product of public capital is tied down by the initial stocks of private and public capital.
However, the increase in z in transition lowers the average product of public capital as well as its
growth rate in transition. The lower stock of private capital increases its average product, which
increases its growth rate after the initial downward jump. The lower stock of private capital helps
reduce congestion and increases the return on consumption by enhancing the utility services derived
from public capital. As a result, consumption grows faster than capital in transition, leading to
an increase in c to its higher long-run equilibrium. As is evident from panel B of Figure 2, the
corresponding responses for a consumption tax increase are exactly the opposite, both qualitatively
and intuitively.
205.3 Welfare Analysis
Tables 4A and 4B report the impact of ￿scal policy shocks (considered in Table 3) on long-run
welfare and their sensitivity to the critical structural parameters of the model, namely ￿; s; ￿y and
￿c. Table 4A examines the welfare responses of the ￿ve policy shocks to variations in the elasticity
of substitution in production, s; and the relative weight of public capital in utility, ￿. Table 4B
reports analogous results for variations in the congestion parameters, ￿y and ￿c.
The welfare changes reported in Table 4A are based on a range of s between 0.25 and in￿nity,
and a range of ￿ between 0 and 0.3. We control for congestion by setting ￿y = ￿c = 0:5; as in
Table 3. Both s and ￿ have a crucial impact not only on the welfare e⁄ects of ￿scal policy shocks,
but also on their relative rankings.
I. An increase in public investment: The relative importance of public capital in utility (￿) plays
a crucial role in evaluating the welfare impact of an increase in public expenditure. For example,
when s = 1 (Cobb-Douglas case) and ￿ = 0, an increase in public investment leads to a welfare loss
of 6.14 percent. However, when ￿ = 0:3, the same increase in public investment leads to a welfare
gain of 2.27 percent. Therefore, if the relative importance of public capital in utility is not taken
into account, the ￿scal authority might grossly underestimate the impact of public expenditures on
welfare. The intuition behind this result can be explained as follows. When ￿ = 0, the underlying
public good only yields direct productivity bene￿ts (as in the literature). Higher spending on this
good leads to a large stock of public capital in the long run, which not only crowds out private
investment and consumption, but is also subject to diminishing returns. Consequently, this leads
to a long-run loss in welfare. But when ￿ = 0:3; the increase in public investment has an additional
impact on welfare by (i) increasing the utility return from consumption, and (ii) raising the return
to private capital by a⁄ecting the marginal rate of substitution between private consumption and
capital, through the term ￿(1￿￿c)c; see (16b). Indeed, in this case it more than o⁄sets the e⁄ects
of diminishing returns from the stock of public capital in production.
In general, for any given ￿, an increase in s lowers the welfare impact of an increase in public
investment. This happens because the larger is s, the higher is the return from private investment
relative to a given level of public investment. Therefore, as s increases, higher public investment
causes the agent to allocate more resources to private investment by substituting away from con-
sumption, which has an adverse e⁄ect on welfare. However, as ￿ increases, the negative e⁄ects of a
larger s are partially alleviated and, in some cases, more than o⁄set as the higher public investment
impacts welfare and private consumption as well.
II. An increase in the income tax rate: An increase in the income tax rate lowers the return to
private capital and leads to a reallocation towards consumption. However, its impact on welfare
depends on its interaction with s and ￿ and consequently on the congestion externalities. For any
given ￿, an increase in s lowers the positive impact on an income tax increase in the presence of
21congestion. For example, when ￿ = 0:1 and s = 1, an income tax increase leads to a small welfare
gain of 0.21 percent. However, when s = 1:25, the same tax increase leads to a welfare loss of 0.42
percent. From Table 4A we note that for low values of s (for s ￿ 1), an income tax increase has
a positive impact on welfare, implying a reduction in congestion. But when s > 1, the impact of
the tax shock on welfare is negative, implying a worsening of congestion. This happens because
an increase in s, by increasing the relative return on private capital, lowers the impact of the tax
on its return and causes a smaller substitution towards consumption, which worsens congestion
and ultimately, welfare. On the other hand, an increase in ￿ increases the welfare gains from
the tax increase for s ￿ 1, and lowers the losses for s > 1. In other words, ￿ > 0 enhances the
e⁄ectiveness of an income tax in the presence of congestion, because the smaller long-run stock of
private capital (following the tax increase) enables a larger ￿ ow of services from public capital in
the utility function by reducing congestion.
III. An increase in the consumption tax rate: When ￿ = 0, the consumption tax is non-
distortionary and has no impact on long-run welfare or on resource allocation. However, when
￿ > 0 (along with 0 < ￿c < 1), a consumption tax does lead to changes in welfare levels. However,
these changes are sensitive to s and in general are opposite to those of an income tax shock. The
introduction of a consumption tax is generally welfare reducing, since it increases the return to
capital relative to consumption, thereby worsening congestion. However, for large values of s,
a consumption tax can actually improve welfare. For example, when ￿ = 0:3 and s = 1, the
introduction of a consumption tax reduces long-run welfare by 0.08 percent. However, as s ! 1,
the consumption tax increases welfare by 0.1 percent. The intuition behind this result can be
understood by focusing on the impact of s on the allocation between private consumption and
capital. When s is small, a given increase in ￿c leads to a large substitution in favor of capital
in order to maintain the no-arbitrage condition in (16b). This worsens welfare by increasing
congestion. On the other hand, as s increases, the required substitution towards private capital
declines, which lowers the welfare losses.
IV. An increase in the income tax rate combined with a consumption subsidy: The mix of
an income tax increase with a consumption subsidy reinforces the e⁄ects of raising the income
tax alone, since the subsidy also lowers the return on private capital relative to consumption.
Therefore, when ￿ > 0 and for s ￿ 1, this policy mix yields higher welfare gains than the use of an
income tax alone. Consequently, for s > 1, the welfare losses from this mix are also larger than
those from an income tax. As in the case of an income tax increase, the welfare impact of this
policy mix is enhanced as ￿ increases.
V. Replacing the income tax rate with a consumption tax: For a ￿nite value of s, replacing
the income tax with a consumption tax is welfare-deteriorating, irrespective of the magnitude of ￿.
This happens because reducing the income tax raises the after-tax return to private capital and, in
the presence of congestion, that has an adverse e⁄ect on welfare. Further, when ￿ > 0 and ￿c 6= 1,
the consumption tax reinforces the increase in the after-tax return on capital, thereby increasing
22the magnitude of the welfare losses. However, as s ! 1, the negative e⁄ect on welfare is reversed,
as the large return to private capital (due to perfect substitutability in production) permits the
agent to reduce its stock of capital and thereby reduce the e⁄ects of congestion in equilibrium as
well.
Ranking Tax Policies: The array of welfare gains and losses in Table 4A permits a convenient
means of ranking the underlying ￿scal policy shocks in terms of their impact on economic welfare.
For the purposes of comparison, we focus on the four taxation policies described above (II-V). The
following patterns emerge from Table 4A:
(i) When ￿ = 0 and s ￿ 1, increasing the income tax is the most preferred policy. However,
for s > 1, replacing the income tax with a consumption tax is the preferred alternative, since ￿c is
non-distortionary in this case.
(ii) When ￿ > 0, an increase in the income tax rate alone is undesirable, irrespective of the
magnitude of s. For s ￿ 1, a mix of an income tax increase and a consumption subsidy is the
most preferred policy choice. For s > 1, the introduction of a consumption tax (with the income
tax remaining constant) dominates other tax policies. However, in the limit, as s ! 1, replacing
the income tax with the consumption tax emerges as the dominant alternative.
The above rankings provide some useful policy implications for economies experiencing conges-
tion in both production and utility services. For instance, once the dual nature of public capital
is recognized (i.e., ￿ > 0), using the income tax as a sole corrective instrument in the presence
of congestion is not desirable. It is the elasticity of substitution in production between public
and private capital that determines the e¢ cacy of an underlying tax policy. Economies that
have limited substitutability in production might be better o⁄ with a mix of an income tax and
a consumption subsidy. Economies with more ￿ exible production structures might be better o⁄
by introducing a consumption tax while keeping income taxes unchanged. Finally, when there is
perfect substitutability in production, the most preferred policy is to replace the income tax with
a consumption tax.
The robustness of the above rankings to variations in the magnitude of the congestion exter-
nalities ￿y and ￿c are reported in Table 4B. Controlling for s and ￿ (by setting s = 1 and ￿ = 0:3)
yields the following observations:
(i) As long as congestion is present in both utility and production functions, i.e., ￿c 6= 1 and
￿y 6= 1, an income tax and consumption subsidy mix is the most preferred policy.
(ii) When ￿c = 1 and ￿y 6= 1, i.e., there is congestion only in the production function, an income
tax is the preferred policy for high levels of congestion (eg. ￿y = 0) in production. However, as
the congestion externality diminishes (￿y ! 1), replacing the income tax with a consumption tax
(which is non-distortionary, since ￿c = 1) emerges as the preferred alternative, a result consistent
with the literature.
(iii) Finally, when there is no congestion in either utility or production, i.e., ￿y = ￿c = 1,
replacing the income tax with a non-distortionary consumption tax is the best policy outcome.
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This paper analyzes the impact of ￿scal policy in a growing economy, where the accumulated
stock of public capital serves both as a public consumption good that facilitates private consump-
tion and is directly welfare-enhancing, and a public investment good that facilitates production
and is directly productivity-enhancing. Modeling for the di⁄erential e⁄ects of congestion in the
utility and productive services derived from public capital, we show that a consumption tax can
be distortionary, with a transmission mechanism that is qualitatively opposite to that of an in-
come tax. However, the impact of these taxes on welfare depends crucially on the elasticity of
substitution in production and the relative importance of public capital in the utility function.
We show that in economies with limited substitutability in production, a combination of an in-
come tax and a consumption subsidy can yield higher welfare gains than using an income or a
consumption tax alone. However, as the elasticity of substitution increases, the e¢ cacy of the
consumption tax relative to other ￿scal instruments increases. In fact, in the limit, when there
is perfect substitutability in production, replacing the income tax with a consumption tax is the
preferred policy. We also show that if the relative importance of public capital in utility is not
taken into account, the ￿scal authority might incorrectly estimate the impact of public policies on
welfare. Our discussion of optimal ￿scal policy re￿nes some existing results in the literature by
demonstrating the possibilities of using both income and consumption-based tax or subsidy policies
as corrective instruments for congestion. The optimal ￿scal policy rules we derive indicate greater
￿ exibility in the choice of corrective policy instruments relative to the sole reliance on the income
tax that is prevalent in the literature. The above ￿ndings indicate that the role played by a public
good and the di⁄erent externalities it generates for di⁄erent agents in the economy are potentially
important in evaluating the role of the government in a growing economy. Our results contribute
to the ￿scal policy-growth literature by highlighting a new channel through which consumption
taxes or subsidies might impact an economy￿ s equilibrium and welfare, even in the absence of an
endogenous labor-leisure choice.
Given the recent policy shift in many developing countries towards market provision of many
public goods such as power generation, water and sewerage, irrigation, highway construction, com-
munications, etc., one fruitful extension of this framework might be to analyze the role of consump-
tion and income taxes when a public good is privately provided. In that case, the consumption tax
rate might be an important determinant of the market price of the public good, by a⁄ecting the
marginal rate of substitution between private consumption and the privately provided public good.
Another area of interest might be to examine the implications of consumption taxation in models
with an endogenous labor-leisure choice, but in the presence of utility and productivity enhancing
public goods. Therefore, we hope that our results will provide the foundations for future research
in the complex domain of public goods and economic growth.
24TABLE 1
Benchmark Equilibrium in the Centrally Planned Economy
The Cobb-Douglas Case (s = 1)
^ z ^ c ^ g C=Y K=Y ^  (%)
￿ = 0 0:25 0:202 0:0668 0:67 3:30 8:10
￿ = 0:1 0:333 0:212 0:0848 0:66 3:04 8:18
￿ = 0:3 0:495 0:227 0:1149 0:653 2:88 8:07
TABLE 2
Optimal Public Investment in the Centrally Planned Economy
(^ g = G=Y )
￿ = 0 ￿ = 0:1 ￿ = 0:3
s = 0:25 0:1343 0:1404 0:1511
s = 1 0:0668 0:0848 0:1149
s ! 1 0:0003 0:0286 0:0766TABLE 3
Equilibrium in a Decentralized Economy with Congestion: Long-run E⁄ects of Fiscal Policy Shocks
Structural Parameters: s = 1; ￿ = 0:3; ￿y = ￿c = 0:5
Base(Pre-shock) Policy Parameters: g = 0:1; ￿y = 0:1; ￿c = 0
~ z ~ c ~ C=Y ~ K=Y ~  (%) d ~ W(%)
Benchmark Equilibrium 0:375 0:209 0:634 3:04 8:74 ￿
I. Increase in public investment: dg = +0:1 0:752 0:202 0:534 2:65 10:05 2:27
II. Increase in income tax rate: d￿y = + 0:1 0:421 0:223 0:663 2:97 7:99 0:51
III. Introduce a consumption tax: d￿c = +0:1 0:372 0:201 0:631 3:05 8:82 ￿0:08
IV. Income tax increase with consumption subsidy: d￿y = +0:1 and d￿c = ￿0:1 0:427 0:225 0:666 2:96 7:91 0:54
V. Replace income tax with consumption tax: d￿y = ￿0:1 and d￿c = +0:1 0:337 0:194 0:603 3:11 9:55 ￿1:07TABLE 4
Welfare Sensitivity of Fiscal Policy Shocks to Structural Parameters and Congestion
A. Welfare Sensitivity to the Elasticity of Substitution (s) and the Relative Importance of Public Capital in Utility (￿)
(￿y = ￿c = 0:5)
￿ = 0 ￿ = 0:1 ￿ = 0:3
I II III IV V I II III IV V I II III IV V
s = 0:25 18.74 6.33 0 6.33 -5.90 23.09 6.51 -0.33 6.85 -6.32 31.60 6.72 -1.00 7.80 -7.07
s = 0:75 -1.14 1.20 0 1.20 -1.61 1.99 1.34 -0.06 1.39 -1.73 7.97 1.57 -0.18 1.74 -1.96
s = 1 -6.14 0.04 0 0.04 -0.77 -3.25 0.21 -0.02 0.22 -0.87 2.27 0.51 -0.08 0.54 -1.07
s = 1:25 -9.28 -0.61 0 -0.61 -0.35 -6.50 -0.42 -0.001 -0.45 -0.43 -1.34 -0.09 -0.03 -0.14 -0.61
s = 1:5 -11.39 -1.01 0 -1.01 -0.11 -8.78 -0.81 0.01 -0.85 -0.19 -3.81 -0.46 0.004 -0.56 -0.35
s ! 1 -21.80 -2.43 0 -2.43 0.57 -19.99 -2.22 0.04 -2.33 0.54 -16.58 -1.84 0.10 -2.12 0.46
B. Welfare Sensitivity to Congestion Parameters (￿y and ￿c)
(s = 1; ￿ = 0:3)
￿y = 0 ￿y = 0:5 ￿y = 1
I II III IV V I II III IV V I II III IV V
￿c = 0 2.31 1.76 -0.35 2.03 -2.64 2.52 1.08 -0.26 1.26 -1.80 2.61 0.49 -0.16 0.56 -1.03
￿c = 0:5 2.10 1.22 -0.14 1.31 -1.93 2.27 0.51 -0.08 0.54 -1.07 2.32 -0.13 -0.01 -0.17 -0.28
￿c = 1 1.89 0.50 0 0.50 -1.18 2.02 -0.28 0 -0.28 -0.23 2.02 -0.98 0 -0.98 0.59
I. Increase in public investment: dg = +0:1
II. Increase in income tax rate: d￿y = +0:1
III. Introduce a consumption tax: d￿c = +0:1
IV. Income tax increase with consumption subsidy: d￿y = +0:1; d￿c = ￿0:1
V. Replace income tax with consumption tax: d￿y = ￿0:1; d￿c = +0:1
Note: Welfare gains are reported in percentages. The numbers in bold represent the largest (smallest) gains (losses) between the tax
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